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A Race To The Middle In Energy Policy
by James E. Parker-Flynn*
INTRODUCTION
Climate change is the gravest threat currently facing
humanity.1 To avoid catastrophic climate change over the coming century, global emissions of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”)
must peak in the very near future and decline steeply thereafter.2 A significant barrier to reducing GHG emissions domestically is the conflict between and within state energy policies.3
Some states encourage renewable energies through Renewable
Portfolio Standards (“RPSs”) and carbon emissions trading
schemes, while others promote the production and utilization of
fossil fuels; most, however, promote both to some degree.4
Internally, states are
motivated to utilize available energy resources —
both renewable and fossil fuel — for in-state
generation of energy, but
are simultaneously motivated to develop those
resources for exportation.5 Texas, for example, produces the most
natural gas and crude oil
of any state, but also has
adopted an aggressive
RPS and leads the nation
in wind energy generation.6 Texas’ use of wind
energy in state reduces
GHG emissions, but Texas oil and natural gas — whether
burned in state or exported — increase GHG emissions. Thus,
some states will partake in a “race to the top” in climate policy
by reducing net GHG emissions through state energy policies, others will “race to the bottom” by increasing net GHG
emissions, while still others will “race to the middle” through
state policies that effectively maintain current GHG emissions
levels. Whether a state races to the top, bottom, or middle
is primarily determined by the energy resources available in
any given state, the economic costs and benefits of developing, using, and exporting those resources, along with ancillary
environmental and social concerns.
This Article posits that the various “races” will have the
practical effect of leaving the nation as a whole, and the states
individually, squarely in “the middle.” States’ prevailing desire
to exploit local resources assures that, absent federal regulations,
the United States will not contribute to significant reductions
in global GHG emissions.7 The gains from energy policies
that encourage renewable energy generation will be offset or

overwhelmed by competing or concurrent desires to exploit
fossil fuel resources like natural gas, coal, and oil. Moreover,
“leakage” and “seepage” of emissions — the former occurs
when a state imports fossil fuel-derived energy from out of state
while the latter occurs when a state exports fossil fuels8 — will
ensure that GHG emissions will not necessarily decrease, even
where the in-state supply of energy is generated from renewable
resources; in other words, a state can race against itself. As a
result, the United States will not contribute significant reductions
in greenhouse gases, climate change will at best be moderately
slowed, and the nation will suffer the consequences.
In order to avoid this
race to the middle, I propose that the nation adopt
a unified energy policy
that not only mandates
increased consumption of
renewable energy through
a national RPS, but that
also restricts the extraction and exportation
of fossil fuels through
Resource Production
Limits (“RPLs”) to
ensure net reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions. A federal policy
that focuses on all areas
of energy production and
consumption will prevent
a “bottom” state from undermining the contributions of a “top”
state, and simultaneously prevent internal state conflicts that
lead to stagnant net emissions.

“The gains from energy
policies that encourage
renewable energy generation
will be offset or overwhelmed
by competing or concurrent
desires to exploit fossil fuel
resources like natural gas,
coal, and oil.”
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A New Race-to Analysis
Race-to theory presents an analytical framework in which
to examine climate change, but a complete analysis must avoid
the segmentation that has plagued previous analyses. It is clear
that the United States must reduce GHG emissions to help
combat climate change. If current domestic energy policies fail
to significantly reduce GHG emissions, then the nation must
implement more effective solutions. Existing race-to analyses
of energy approaches to the climate problem generally focus on
whether RPSs represent a race-to-the-top.9 These analyses, in
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following traditional race-to formulas, fail to account for certain
factors that could lead to the middle—stagnant national emissions in spite of reduced emissions locally. Because the middle
represents a danger to the United States that is only slightly less
worrisome than the bottom, it is imperative to know whether
state energy policies are actually racing to the top, bottom, or
somewhere in between.
Most commentators have examined the competing races —
those to the top and bottom — from a regulatory framework;
they have examined whether state governments, in the absence
of federal regulation, will craft environmental regulations that
will either increase or decrease social welfare.10 Public welfare
is generally measured through an analysis of costs and benefits that quantifies the ecological, economic, and public health
implications of environmental regulations,11 though at times the
measure is the mere decrease or increase in environmental regulations.12 Further, commentators examine how individual states
race with others to attract business, and how those races affect
the populaces of those states.13
This Article diverges
from traditional race-to
analyses in two critical
respects. First, it explores
how states’ decisions
in promoting and
using available energy
resources will affect net
GHG emissions from a
results-oriented perspective. A race to the bottom
thus leads to increased
GHG emissions, while
a race to the top leads to
decreased GHG emissions. The middle represents stagnant emissions.
Public welfare — and associated analyses of costs and benefits — is not specifically addressed because it is assumed that
increased or stagnant emissions will be detrimental to the longterm health and economic stability of the country.14 Likewise,
the Article only considers climate change effects, and does not
consider other environmental consequences of state policies that
lead to greater or lesser emissions.
Second, this Article examines how the climate impacts of
energy decisions — made across the country and in relation
to vastly different energy resources — cumulatively manifest
at the national level.15 Typically, race-to analyses examine the
impact of regulations, or the lack thereof, within the participating states.16 Environmental impacts are thus constrained by
both the source of the pollution and the proximate geographic
area. For instance, an analysis might look at the effect of air
pollution from coal burning power plants on nearby populations, and how relaxed regulations might attract new coal
plants but increase the amount of dangerous pollution. Such
an analysis is essentially the same wherever the power plant

happens to be; decreased regulations might mean more pollution and health consequences, but increased job opportunities.
But all of the effects of the regulations are constrained to the
populations of the regulating states and proximate areas, and
possibly the populations of states that lost out on the new coal
plant because of more stringent regulations.
Contrastingly, the national approach proposed herein is
more consistent with the premise of the Article because the
harms of increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere manifest
both globally and locally,17 but cannot be constrained to a single
geographic area. Indeed, climate change disparately impacts different geographic areas,18 but regional effects are not determined
or altered by the energy source or the method of energy generation and extraction. For example, all GHG emissions from coalburning power plants contribute to climate change, yet people
near a coal-burning power plant in Pennsylvania will experience
a different set of climate consequences than people near a coal
burning power plant in South Texas.19 Thus, decreasing GHG
emissions from coal plants in Pennsylvania will have different
climate consequences on
the local population than
if the same reductions
are made in South Texas.
Further, because GHG
emissions are “wellmixed” in the atmosphere,
increased emissions from
a Pennsylvania coal
plant will affect distant
populations in addition
to local and proximate
populations. It is thus
of no moment whether
the emissions of an individual state decrease if
the national emissions
do not. Accordingly, the Article examines whether state energy
policies lead to increased, decreased, or stagnant emissions on
the national level. In order to properly examine the climate race
from a national perspective, however, it is critical to understand
the state energy policies that form the foundation of the national
energy policy.

“Indeed, climate change
disparately impacts different
geographic areas, but regional
effects are not determined or
altered by the energy source
or the method of energy
generation and extraction.”
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STATE ENERGY POLICIES
Whether state energy policies represent a race to the top,
middle, or bottom for climate change depends on the nature of
those policies. In analyzing state energy policies, many commentators focus only on the decisions that affect the in-state generation and use of energy resources. A complete energy policy,
however, encompasses in-state generation as well as in-state
production of energy resources — which include all resources
used to generate electricity as well as fuels — regardless of
whether those resources are used in-state. Accordingly, this
Part first examines energy generation, and then the production
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of energy resources, in order to fully analyze the effect of state
energy policies on GHG emissions.

Energy Generation
States with RPSs
States have increasingly adopted RPSs as part of their energy
policies in the past twenty years.20 An RPS, in simple terms,
requires utilities within its jurisdiction to “provide a specified
amount or percentage of power from renewable sources as part
of their total offering of electricity.”21 Currently, thirty-seven
states and the District of Columbia have either a mandatory
RPS or a statute outlining voluntary renewable energy goals.22
RPSs ideally will contribute to reductions in GHG emissions by
mandating or promoting the use of energy sources that emit less
GHGs than traditional fossil fuel energy sources.23 Indeed some
commentators argue that RPSs, because they involve voluntary
and often ambitious state efforts to reduce GHGs despite the
lack of a federal mandate, represent races to the top.24
Whether RPSs represent a path forward to a more sustainable energy future, or simply political greenwashing,25 there is
an underlying truth about them: RPSs are only segments, and
often quite small segments, of state energy policies. In other
words, an RPS explicitly describes only part of the energy policy
of a state, though it implicitly says much more. For instance,
Ohio’s RPS requires that all retail electricity providers, except
for municipal utilities and electric cooperatives, provide at least
twenty-five percent of retail electricity supply from alternative
energy sources by 2025.26 The Ohio RPS, therefore, represents
one-quarter of the state energy policy regarding energy generation. The remaining three quarters are presumably represented by
an unwritten policy to generate energy in any way that does not
violate established laws, even where that generation may lead to
greater GHG emissions.27 This unwritten policy becomes more
unnerving when one accounts for potential growth in population and energy demand; indeed, seventy-five percent of Ohio’s
energy supply in 2025 could, theoretically, account for as much
energy as one hundred percent of Ohio’s energy use today.28 In
that case, that state’s total emissions would not decrease at all.
Or, the cost of complying with the RPS could lead Ohio energy
producers to replace energy currently derived from nuclear
power or natural gas with energy from coal, increasing GHG
emissions even as the state gets more energy from renewables.29
Similarly worrisome, the Ohio RPS allows the public energy
commission to classify any new technology as an advanced
energy source.30 This allowance is not limited by any emissions
requirements,31 meaning a new technology to derive energy
from coal could be considered an advanced energy source,
even if it increases GHG emissions. Many other RPSs have
similarly flexible definitions of renewable or alternative energy
sources that may encourage GHG-intensive energy generation.32
Additionally, there are concerns about states including existing
hydroelectric power in their RPSs, which could preclude the
addition of any new renewable energy.33 Conversely, some state
RPSs do not include local hydroelectric or geothermal power,

6

which forces the state to import less efficient renewable energy
from out of state to meet the standard.34
Finally, the Ohio RPS — like others — does not account for
in-state production of energy sources like coal, gas, and oil.35
Regulations that apply to production of energy sources are found
elsewhere in the Ohio code.36 These regulations do not set limits
on the total amount of the energy source that can be extracted
or produced;37 indeed, every deposit of oil and coal could
theoretically be exploited under the current Ohio regulations.
More disturbingly, the word “emission” is not found anywhere
in any of the regulations regarding oil, gas, and coal production.38 Exploitation of energy resources is philosophically and
practically separated from both energy generation and climate
change impacts.39 Accordingly, states may have RPSs, but none
have meaningful RPLs (resource production limits) to prevent
or substantially limit the extraction and exportation of fossil
fuel resources. The failure to connect generation and production
muddies the race-to picture even further.
The Ohio RPS is of course just one example, and is not
intended to indicate that all RPSs will inherently lead to stagnant
or rising GHG emissions. Many states are far more aggressive
with their goals.40 Additionally, many states have enacted other
climate initiatives that may, alongside RPSs, lead to lower GHG
emissions.41 But, the Ohio RPS exemplifies the division between
energy generation and production that undermines existing state
energy policy measures to address climate change. In short, it
demonstrates that even those states that have RPSs may end up
racing somewhere other than the top.

States Without RPSs
While deficiencies in state RPSs may prevent significant GHG reduction, more worrisome are states that lack any
RPS. The states that do not currently have RPSs are Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Wyoming.42 Nevertheless, these states may, and often do, utilize
or promote renewable energy sources. For instance, Florida is
home to “some of the largest solar power plants nationwide.”43
Although Florida does not have a RPS, it does “encourage renewable electric energy generation” through its Energy Economic
Zone Pilot Program.44 Additionally, Florida actually restricts the
amount of natural gas and oil produced from state pools to the
“reasonable market demand for oil or gas in this state” — one
of the rare state a RPL.45 In addition to encouraging renewable
energy, states without RPSs — like those with — may also
feature energy efficiency standards, building requirements, and
other demand-side management implements that may indirectly
decrease GHGs from energy generation.46 Additionally, these
states may offer tax credits or rebates for clean or renewable
energy generation.47
While GHG emissions reductions from efficiency standards
and tax incentives may obtain, energy generators in states without RPSs are not required to generate energy from renewable
sources. Motivation to utilize renewables thus rests on some
combination of altruism, economics, reputational incentives,
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

and availability of renewable sources. As noted above, Florida
encourages renewable production and generates a fair amount
of solar energy, relatively. Florida does not compare to the
southwestern states in solar energy potential, but it does have
areas that offer more solar potential than other eastern states.48
The state thus has availability and may also have reputational
incentives to utilize solar power; the state motto is, of course, the
Sunshine State. Moreover, Florida has over 1,200 miles of coastline and is especially vulnerable to one of climate change’s most
visible impacts, sea level rise.49 Rising sea levels not only pose
a serious risk to coastal property in the future, they contribute to
rising insurance rates for residents, and threaten Florida’s drinking water.50 Nevertheless, Florida still generates over 83% of its
energy from fossil fuel resources, 13.5% from nuclear energy,
and only .005% from solar energy.51 Florida, which has numerous
incentives to reduce GHG reduce greenhouse gas emissions —
available renewable resources, economic and reputational incentives, as possibly the altruistic incentive to protect citizens —
still produces more carbon dioxide emissions than all but
four states. 52 Without
an RPS, consequential
reductions in GHG emissions are unlikely.
Like the states with
RPSs, states without
do not set meaningful
limits on the extraction
and production of fossil
fuel resources; Florida’s
RPL, for instance, is a
moot instrument, based
on in-state consumption
and production. Without
material limits on either
the production of fossil fuel or the GHG emissions from generation, energy generation and production in the fourteen states
without RPSs are limited only by other regulations. It is likely,
for instance, that Wyoming will continue to mine and burn coal
at exceptional rates53 unless other environmental regulations
are established to control air pollution that indirectly or directly
decrease GHG emissions.54 It is unlikely, however, that any independent regulations will slow the extraction of coal. State energy
policies that do not feature RPSs are similarly motivated to use
available resources, the cost and benefits that result from the
exploitation of those resources, and the cost to import outside
energy or electricity if necessary. Unlike the states with RPSs,
however, those without have no mandate to lower emissions
from in-state generation. Consequently, whether these fourteen
states race to the top or bottom will depend on which resources
they can exploit or import.

sources are used for generation, exploitation of those resources
inherently occurs. Accordingly, this section takes a cursory
examination of the various energy resources that states exploit,
for both generation and exportation, and the climate impacts of
those resources.

Fossil Fuels and Natural Gas
Production of natural gas has exploded in recent years due
to increased recovery of gas from shale deposits.56 Proponents
of natural gas have touted it as a cleaner source of energy than
other fossil fuels (coal and oil primarily); accordingly, advocates argue that it should serve as a “bridge” to a lower carbon
society.57 The heart of the argument is that natural gas produces
significantly lower GHG emissions than other fossil fuels when
burned — in addition to its other environmental advantages over
other fossil fuels58 — and thus the United States should use
natural gas to replace coal in electricity production and gasoline
in certain segments of the transportation industry.59 By doing so,
the U.S. could use natural gas as a bridge fuel to a future where
the U.S. relies entirely
on “efficiency, renewable
sources, and low-carbon
fossil fuels.”60
While the idea of
natural gas as a bridge
fuel is appealing, there
is considerable debate in
the academic literature
about the quantity of
GHG emissions reductions, if any, natural gas
provides over other fossil
fuels.61 There seems to
be no debate that natural
gas produces fewer GHGs than other fossil fuels at the electricity generation stage;62 it is possible, however, that “upstream”
GHG contributions — such as methane leakage at the extraction
and transmission stages — offset any gains achieved.63 Whether
natural gas produces half as many GHGs as other fossil fuels,
or whether it produces the same or more, the fact remains that
natural gas is a fossil fuel and will emit some level of GHGs
when produced and used.64 Further, natural gas produces fewer
emissions of sulfur dioxide and aerosols than coal, which — in a
cruel twist — could reduce the benefits of relying on natural gas
to combat climate change.65
Because natural gas produces GHG emissions that are significantly higher than those produced by renewable resources
like solar and wind, some commentators are concerned that
increased reliance on natural gas may leave the U.S. stuck on the
proverbial bridge.66 A full discussion of the reasons why natural
gas may not be an ideal bridge to a low carbon future is beyond
the scope of this Article. Two basic premises behind the “bridge
to nowhere” argument are worth examining briefly, however.
First, cheap natural gas will not only replace coal and oil, it
may also prevent development of renewable energy.67 This fear

“Motivation to utilize
renewables thus rests on some
combination of altruism,
economics, reputational
incentives, and availability
of renewable sources.”

Exploitation of Energy Resources
As noted above, state energy policies explicitly or implicitly
encourage the exploitation of local energy resources.55 Because
states lack RPLs and at best set standards on what energy
Winter 2015
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was explored in a study conducted by the International Energy
Agency in 2011, which assumed that natural gas use would
account for up to twenty-five percent of world energy supply
in 2035, but that it would not significantly lower global carbon
dioxide emissions.68 In such a scenario, a long-term and dangerous warming of 3.5ºC (6.3ºF) would still be likely.69 Second,
new infrastructure is needed to fully exploit natural gas, and “a
new generation of gas-fired power stations would have a lifetime
of at least 25 years, effectively ‘locking in’ billion of tonnes of
carbon emissions a year.”70 If the United States invests heavily
in natural gas infrastructure now, new renewable infrastructure is
effectively priced out by the sunken cost.
Whether natural gas represents a bridge to nowhere, a bridge
to a sustainable energy future, or something in the middle, there
is no doubt that natural gas production in the United States has
increased over the past 20 years.71 Large domestic natural gas
deposits are distributed throughout the county, and estimates of
natural gas deposits seemingly increase every year, largely from
the massive gas resources in the Marcellus Shale deposits that
span across Pennsylvania, New York, West Virginia, and Ohio.72
The increased production
is largely the result of two
technologies — hydraulic
fracturing and horizontal
drilling — that allow producers to exploit deposits
of gas that are locked in
shale and other tight-rock
formations.73 Producers
can now extract gas more
cheaply, and the market
price has accordingly
dropped. As long as there
are no restrictions on the
extraction of natural gas
based on the eventual emissions that will result, the enormous
economic incentives ensure that extraction and consumption of
gas will continue to increase globally.74

and North Dakota.84 Many coal-producing states offer incentives
or tax exemptions for the production or consumption of coal.85
The EIA predicts the price of domestic coal will rise incrementally over the coming years — primarily as a result of increased
production costs associated with more costly mines — which
will result in the retirement of many coal-fired power plants and
subsequent replacement by cheaper natural gas plants.86 Despite
the reduction in plants and increase in cost, however, domestic
coal consumption and production is expected to increase in the
United States by 2040.87 States with large coal deposits will still
have the economic incentive to exploit those deposits.88
Coal is the most carbon intensive of the fossil fuel energy
sources.89 While the debate over the lifecycle GHG emissions
from natural gas have cast some doubt on the traditional idea
that coal is the dirtiest fossil fuel,90 there seems to be no debate
that coal produces more GHG emissions at the generation phase
than from any other fossil fuel.91 The emissions from burning
coal can be mitigated through carbon capture and storage techniques, which produces “clean” coal.92 Clean coal has its own
set of risks, however, one of which is that the captured and stored
carbon dioxide will find
its way back into the
atmosphere.93 Even if the
captured carbon dioxide
stays underground, clean
coal still produces carbon
dioxide emissions and
the process of cleaning
the coal requires energy,
which leads to more
emissions.94 Finally, the
cost to remove and store
substantial amounts of
carbon dioxide from coal
emissions is very high,95
which suggests energy companies will settle for “cleaner” coal,
rather than “clean” coal. Without state RPLs to slow coal production, coal will still be economically viable for decades and
states with large coal deposits will likely continue to exploit
local coal resources.

“If the United States invests
heavily in natural gas
infrastructure now, new
renewable infrastructure
is effectively priced out
by the sunken cost.”

Coal75
Although perhaps not expanding as rapidly as gas, coal
production and consumption have increased nationally over the
past thirty years.76 In the years since 2007 and 2008, however,
domestic production and consumption have decreased slightly.77
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration
(“EIA”), the United States has over four billion short tons of
demonstrated coal reserves,78 and over seventeen billion short
tons of recoverable coal.79 Global demand for coal, however, is
rising, particularly in Asia.80 Indeed, China and India, among
others, are adding new coal burning facilities at an alarming
rate.81 Accordingly, emissions from coal are rising as well.82 The
United States has more recoverable deposits of coal than any
other nation, including China,83 and exports are rising.
Domestically, sizable coal deposits are found in many
states, including Wyoming, West Virginia, Illinois, Kentucky,
8

Oil
The United States is a considerable producer of petroleum,
and domestic production is increasing.96 Forecasts show that
the United States will overtake Saudi Arabia as the world’s
largest producer of oil by 2015.97 Like natural gas, much of the
increased production in oil comes from shale deposits and the
increased use of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.98
The increased production of domestic oil has been paced in
recent years by an increase in exports of U.S. oil.99
The largest producers of domestic oil are Texas, North
Dakota, Alaska, and California.100 Texas currently leads the
other states by a sizable margin, and production in Texas and
North Dakota have increased substantially since 2006.101 While
the increase in Texas’s production was larger, the North Dakota
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

increase is perhaps more alarming — the state’s production of
oil more than tripled over that period.102 The majority of North
Dakota’s increase comes from the Bakken formation.103 In just
a few short years, North Dakota has transformed itself from the
seventh leading state-producer of domestic oil to the third, and
now trails only Texas and California.104
Petroleum produces substantial greenhouse gases when
burned.105 The transportation sector is responsible for twentyseven percent of domestic GHG emissions, and over ninety
percent of those emissions are from petroleum products like
gasoline and diesel.106 Additional GHGs, in the form of carbon
dioxide and methane, are released during both the extraction of
petroleum and the refining process.107 The use of oil products is,
in short, an extreme net contributor to climate change.
Fossil fuels are incredibly abundant in the United States.
The nation has large supplies of natural gas, coal, and petroleum,
and production of all three is poised to rise in the years ahead.
Technologies like hydraulic fracturing have opened up vast new
reserves of both natural gas and oil. Increased international reliance on coal also ensures
a steady demand for
domestic coal. Because
of the vast resources
and seemingly endless
demands, states are
poised to exploit their fossil fuel resources for both
in-state use and export in
the years ahead. Fossil
fuels are not the only
energy sources available
to states, however, and in
the coming years renewable energy will also play
an important role in state
energy policies.

a small percentage of total domestic energy, though the actual
total is difficult to quantify.114
While the majority of domestic solar power potential is in
the southwestern United States, solar power resources are ubiquitous; indeed, the states that currently provide the most incentives
to exploit solar power include many non-southwestern states.115
Oregon, for instance, is hardly a bastion of sunshine, yet the
state introduced its first solar tax credit over thirty years ago and
is still a leader in production of electricity from solar generation sources.116 Moreover, states like Georgia and Missouri are
positioned to greatly benefit from solar energy for a number of
reasons beyond pure solar insolation potential, including cost of
electricity and cost of installation.117 Solar power is currently
limited, however, by intermittency issues.
Although intermittency places a limit on solar power generation, the cost of solar photovoltaic installation, which has
dropped significantly in recent years,118 is now less of a restraint
on the expansion of solar power than it was previously. The drop
stems from reductions in the cost of both the solar modules and
non-module components
of installation. 119 As
noted above, however,
installation costs vary
significantly by state.120
In a few years, solar
energy may actually be
as cheap as, or cheaper
than, energy from fossil
fuels.121 Solar also provides a fantastic energy
resource for states that
prioritize dramatically
reduced GHG emissions;
both CSP and PV solar
produce signif icantly
fewer life cycle GHG
emissions than fossil fuels.122 Despite the falling costs and emissions reduction potential, the EIA projects that solar power will
continue to supply only a small portion of total domestic energy
in the coming decades.123 States thus have considerable solar
resources and incentives to exploit those resources, but it is not
clear that solar will significantly reduce reliance on fossil fuels.

“The transportation sector is
responsible for twenty-seven
percent of domestic GHG
emissions, and over ninety
percent of those emissions
are from petroleum products
like gasoline and diesel.”

Renewable Energy Resources
States are increasingly utilizing domestic renewable sources
in addition to exploiting fossil fuel resources. This section will
briefly describe the primary renewable energy resources available to states.

Solar Power
Although fossil fuels and wind would not exist without
energy from the sun,108 solar power traditionally refers to energy
directly produced from the sun through photovoltaic (“PV”)
panels or by concentrating the sun’s power to produce thermal
energy (concentrated solar power, or “CSP”).109 The United
States has immense solar power potential, particularly in the
Southwest.110 Solar power may be harvested at the macro level in
large solar plants like the Ivanpah solar thermal plant111 and the
Desert Sunlight PV plant,112 both located in California’s Mojave
Desert. Additionally, communities and individual homeowners
may harvest solar power at the micro level.113 Despite massive
solar power potential, however, solar power only accounts for
Winter 2015

Wind Power
While solar power is an underutilized yet increasingly
exploited energy resource, wind power is the current king of
non-hydro renewable energy resources.124 The United States has
immense wind potential, particularly in the central portion of the
country — from Texas up to Canada — and off certain coasts.125
Installation of utility grade wind power has been increasing
steadily in recent years.126 The EIA, however, expects wind to
grow at a slightly slower pace than solar photovoltaic over the
next three decades.127
Texas is the state that produces the most energy from wind,
followed by California, Iowa, Illinois, Oregon, Oklahoma,
9

and Washington.128 Much of the wind industry boon has been
fueled by a federal tax credit that is poised to expire at the end
of 2012.129 Wind power development may slow considerably
because of the expiration of the tax credit and the glut of cheap
natural gas.130 Despite cost concerns, wind is an abundant natural resource available to many states, and wind energy produces
dramatically less GHG emissions than fossil fuel energy.131
Like with solar power, economic and environmental incentives,
as well as intermittency issues, accompany wind power, but it
is unlikely that the incentives are substantial enough to propel
wind power ahead of fossil fuel power in state energy policies.

Other Renewable Energy Sources
There are numerous other renewable energy sources available to states. Most prominently is hydroelectric power, which
accounts for fifty-two percent of all renewable energy produced
in the United States.132 Hydroelectric power generation has
remained fairly steady in
the nation over the past
two decades. 133 While
almost all states utilize
hydroelectric power to
some extent, the Pacific
coast states are the clear
leaders in hydroelectric
energy generation. 134
Hydroelectric power produces few GHG emissions,135 and is a cheap
source of power. 136
Unfortunately, many of
the best hydroelectric
resources have already
b e e n d eve l o p e d, 1 3 7
though there is still
potential for future
exploitation from existing but non-powered
dams.138 While hydroelectric power is renewable and does not
suffer from the intermittency issues of solar and wind, it is
dependent on rainfall. Climate change and attendant changes
in precipitation could thus alter the amount of hydropower
available to many states.
In addition to hydropower, there is energy potential, both
realized and untapped, in biomass and biofuels, geothermal
sources, and waves and tides.139 Biomass and biofuels can be
generated from a number of sources, including wood, waste, and
corn.140 It is difficult to quantify the exact GHG reduction potential of bioenergy because it can be produced from so many different sources, each with attendant land-use consequences and
GHG potential.141 The IPCC concludes that most bioenergy has
some GHG mitigation potential, but notes that the sustainability
of bioenergy rests heavily on land-use practices.142
Geothermal energy — yet another renewable resource —
represents approximately three percent of all renewable energy

currently produced in the United States.143 California produces
the most geothermal energy,144 though there is significant geothermal potential in many of the western states.145 Although
geothermal energy produces very few GHG emissions, 146
energy growth in this sector has been slower than either wind
or solar because of siting, cost, and transmission concerns,
among other issues.147
Finally, wave and tidal power are still in nascent stages.148
Because of costs and practical difficulties, these two ocean power
sources are not expected to meaningfully contribute to domestic
power for many years.149
While ocean power is still a negligible source of energy,
the United States is blessed with many other abundant renewable energy resources, and the nation has substantial fossil
fuel resources. State energy policies encourage the exploitation of available resources, particularly when those sources
are cheap. Some states explicitly mandate or encourage the
use of renewable energy
for in-state generation
through the use of RPSs,
although renewable
energy plays some role
even in states that do not
made its use. Implicitly,
however, states segregate energy generation
from the extraction and
production of energy
resources. Because of
this philosophical and
practical divide between
generation and production, no states — including those with aggressive
RPSs — have meaningful RPLs. The failure
of state energy policies
to address production
negates efforts to significantly reduce GHG emissions through
RPSs, and assures that at best, the United States is racing to the
middle in climate change abatement.

“The crux of the issue is
whether those resources
and incentives, embedded
in state energy policies,
will lead to decreased
GHG emissions (the “top”),
increased GHG emissions
(the “bottom”), or somewhere
in between (the “middle”).”
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A RACE TO THE MIDDLE
Conflict and Causation:
Production and Generation
The United States has enormous and varied energy
resources, and competing incentives to produce and use those
resources. The crux of the issue is whether those resources
and incentives, embedded in state energy policies, will lead
to decreased GHG emissions (the “top”), increased GHG
emissions (the “bottom”), or somewhere in between (the
“middle”). Here, I argue that state energy policies will lead
the U.S. to either the middle or the bottom, and consequently,
the U.S. should adopt a federal energy policy that prioritizes
both renewable energy generation and simultaneously limits
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the production of fossil fuel resources to facilitate a dramatic
decrease in GHG emissions. In other words, the United States
should implement a stringent national RPS and RPL.150
The primary reason that state energy policies will lead the
United States to the middle is conflict: conflict between states,
and conflict within states. As to the former, for instance, one
state will vigorously promote renewable energy while another
will cling to and even expand fossil fuel for in-state generation; the two states effectively cancel the other out. The latter
conflict is more concerning and complex, and is exemplified by
schizophrenic state energy policies that simultaneously seek to
promote renewable energy generation and fossil fuel production.
Failure to address the production of fossil fuel resources in state
policies ensures that the country races to the middle in battle
against climate change.

Conflict Between States
At the core of both conflicts are available energy resources,
the cost and feasibility of utilizing those energy resources, and
the potential economic benefits of extracting those resources,
whether used in state or elsewhere. Greatly simplified, states with
abundant fossil fuel resources will maximize those resources as
long as economic incentives exist, while states with abundant
renewable energy resources will maximize those resources. If
a state has insufficient internal resources to power the state, it
will either import energy resources for in-state generation, or
directly import electricity from other states.151 Incentives to
exploit renewable energy are more complex, as some states may
desire to produce or use renewable energy for perceived moral,
environmental, or reputational benefits.
Despite complex alternative incentives to exploit renewable
resources, available resources and economic considerations are
still the primary drivers behind state energy policies, and can
lead a state to adopt policies that are either beneficial or detrimental in the climate context. Oregon, for instance, is generally
considered an environmentally conscious state; it has a relatively
ambitious RPS152 and zealously promotes solar energy despite
a relative dearth of solar resources.153 It has thus adopted an
energy policy that is racing to the top in the climate context.
But this policy is still dependent on available resources and
economics; in-state generation of electricity comes primarily
from hydroelectric power, of which Oregon has substantial and
affordable in-state resources.154 The state also has significant
wind resources, but transmission and economic considerations
have prevented wind from consistently providing a large portion
of Oregon’s electricity.155 Nevertheless, decreasing costs and
availability drive the state to further develop wind resources.
Only a small portion of Oregon’s energy consumption derives
from non-biomass, non-hydro renewable resources.156 Finally,
Oregon generates almost thirty percent of its electricity from
either natural gas or coal,157 though it has no domestic fossil fuel
resources.158 The state thus produces over eighty-five percent of
its electricity from hydroelectric and fossil fuels — which are
cheap and available, and cheap to import, respectively — while
wind, which is available and cheaper than before, becomes a
Winter 2015

bigger part of the state profile. Regardless of the motivations,
however, Oregon’s remains a sterling example of a state energy
policy that heavily promotes renewable energy.
In contrast to Oregon, Wyoming has considerable fossil
fuel resources,159 but no RPS.160 Almost ninety-three percent
of Wyoming electricity generation is from coal and natural gas,
with coal accounting for the overwhelming majority.161 When
factoring in transportation, almost ninety-five percent of all
energy consumed in Wyoming derives from fossil fuels.162 In
addition to fossil fuel resources, Wyoming has abundant wind
resources.163 Although Wyoming has not yet maximized its wind
resources, it appears that the state is beginning to exploit its vast
wind potential.164 Because the state has no RPS, however, there
is no mandate for renewable energy generation. As such, the
state will only fully maximize local wind resources if economically feasible, or if other factors, like environmental concerns,
overwhelm the desire to use cheap, local coal. Regardless, it
appears that Wyoming coal production will continue unabated
in the immediate future,165 and that the state’s coal exports will
continue to increase.166
Oregon and Wyoming represent two sides of the energy
coin. One has abundant renewable energy resources coupled
with strong internal economic and environmental incentives to
promote renewable energy, while the other has abundant fossil
fuel resources and formidable economic incentives to exploit
those resources. The two state energy policies philosophically
negate each other167 and ensure that while one state races to the
top with decreased GHG emissions from in-state generation of
electricity, the other races to the bottom through production of
substantial amounts of GHG-producing fossil fuels for both instate use and for export elsewhere.

Conflict Within States And The Problems of
Leakage and Seepage
In addition to conflict between state energy policies, there is
conflict within individual state energy policies that results from
the philosophical and practical disconnect between energy generation and production. As noted previously, states may or may
not have RPSs, but none currently have meaningful RPLs. This
conflict between generation and production can cause a state to
race against itself; for instance, a state with a strong RPS may
offset the resultant GHG reductions through increased exports
of fossil fuels.
The segmentation of production and generation is revealed
by “leakage” and “seepage,” two concepts for which race
analyses must account. “Leakage” occurs when strict in-state
environmental regulations drive energy generation out-of-state,
where regulations are not as strict.168 Instead of building new
renewable power plants, a state may instead import some electricity from existing plants out of state.169 As a result, a state may
achieve its RPS goals without fundamentally altering the amount
of greenhouse gas emissions generated by its populace.170
Even where the in-state generation policies promote the
use of renewable energies or alternative fossil fuels like natural gas, conflicting drivers may also lead to the more insidious
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form of leakage, which I call “seepage.” Seepage occurs when
increased in-state utilization of renewable and alternative energy
sources leads to greater exports of traditional fossil fuels, and
subsequently, stagnant or increased GHG emissions. While state
energy policies may promote the domestic use of alternative and
renewable energies, there are currently no states that have implemented meaningful RPLs that prevent the production and sale
of, for instance, coal.171 If local (or domestic) demand decreases
due to RPSs or other state measures, supply and demand economics suggest that coal producers — if coal is still cheap to
produce and profitable to sell — will simply attempt to sell their
goods elsewhere; there are still many places, both domestically
and internationally, that burn coal, and indeed, coal exports from
the U.S. are increasing.172 This internal conflict to profit from
the export of fossil fuels is evident even in states that do not produce fossil fuels. Oregon, for instance, produces no coal and is
phasing out existing coal power plants, but the state nevertheless
assists in the export of Wyoming coal through Oregon ports.173
Indeed, Oregon is considering more projects that
would allow it to export
even more coal.174
Thus, powerful economic incentives assure
that fossil fuel supply
and its consequent GHG
emissions will seep or
leak abroad and, consequently, net GHG emissions will not decline.175
It is irrelevant whether
or not the increase in
exports is a direct result
of state energy policies
that limit in-state generation of electricity from
fossil fuels, or simply the
result of greater demand abroad176; state-based energy policies
that focus only on energy generation cannot lead to decreased
global emissions if local production of greenhouse gas intensive
fuels are not simultaneously reduced.

Texas is one of the leading exporters of oil products to foreign
countries.183 Despite the widespread use of wind energy in the
state, Texas leads the nation in GHG emissions.184
Texas thus demonstrates the conflicting interests rampant in
state energy policies. It has substantial energy resources, both
renewable and fossil fuel, and tremendous incentives to exploit
all of its resources. Because of its location — in the Southwest
with a Gulf Coast border — Texas is at risk of substantial damages from climate change. Its coast is threatened by several feet
of sea level rise,185 its water resources threatened by rising temperatures and faster evaporation rates,186 its citizens threatened
by extreme heat,187 and its agriculture at risk from drought.188
The potential devastation that Texas faces from climate change
provides the state incredible incentive to transition as quickly
as possible to renewable energies that reduce GHG emissions.
Conversely, Texas has tremendous economic incentives to
exploit its fossil fuel resources regardless of how it generates
energy in state. Petroleum accounts for over twenty percent of
Texas exports.189 There
are so many fossil fuel
reserves in the state that
energy companies spend
billions of dollars on royalties; indeed, almost a
billion dollars in royalties
annually goes to Texas
itself.190 Not surprisingly,
Texas oil and gas production, far from decreasing,
is rising.191
Texas is thus racing against Texas. Its
energy policy promotes
renewable energy use
while it simultaneously
encourages the production and use of fossil fuel
resources. The state is adding in-state energy generation from
renewable sources, but also from fossil fuel resources; subsequently, in-state emissions still lead the nation. Texas is also
exporting ever-greater amounts of fossil fuels, ensuring that
emissions eliminated domestically seep abroad. Because of its
schizophrenic energy policy, Texas is at best racing to the middle
as an individual state, and at worst is offsetting the gains of states
that race to the top.
States, like Texas, have conflicting incentives to exploit both
fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. State energy policies
at best limit emissions from in-state generation, but universally
ignore the production and export of fossil fuels. An analysis
that accounts for entire energy policies, including production,
sheds new light on the effectiveness of state energy policies
to address climate change. Because of conflicts between and
among states, including the failure of state energy policies to
set meaningful RPLs, state energy policies do not represent a
race to the top in climate policy. Some disparate state energy

“While state energy policies
may promote the domestic
use of alternative and
renewable energies, there are
currently no states that have
implemented meaningful RPLs
that prevent the production
and sale of, for instance, coal.”

The Cautionary Case of Texas
Perhaps no state better demonstrates the conflict driving
the United States to the middle than Texas. Texas has more fossil fuel reserves and more renewable energy potential than any
other state.177 It has a fairly aggressive RPS that calls for at least
10,000 megawatts of renewable energy electricity generation
by 2025.178 Texas already produces more electricity from wind
energy than any other state, and will add considerably more in
the next decade.179 Conversely, the state also leads the nation
in both oil and natural gas production.180 In addition to its vast
internal oil and gas reserves, Texas is also the nation’s largest
refiner of oil,181 much of which is extracted in other states and
Canada.182 Additionally, with port access in the Gulf of Mexico,
12
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policies race in opposite directions, and effectively cancel each
other out, while other state energy policies race internally to a
stalemate. Consequently, state energy policies represent a race to
the middle at best.

The Argument for a Federal Policy
Because conflicting interests assure that state energy policies will at best lead the nation to the middle — an unacceptable position if the United States is to avoid the substantial,
adverse impacts of climate change — the underlying solution
is clear: the United States must implement a unified federal
energy policy that both promotes the domestic utilization of
renewable energy and restricts the domestic extraction and
production of fossil fuels. Only through a strong federal floor
that includes a stringent RPS and RPL — or alternate system
of limiting production192 — can the nation assure meaningfully
reduced net GHG emissions. The federal energy policy should
proscribe GHG limits from energy generation that steadily and
signif icantly decrease
over the next few
decades. Similarly, the
policy should proscribe
a RPL that mandates
limits on the extraction
and production of fossil
fuels. Like the limits on
generation, allowable
extraction under the
national RPL should
consistently decline
over the years to ensure
meaningful reductions in
GHG emissions.
Through a unified
federal energy policy
that limits both the
production of energy
sources and subsequent generation, the United States can
achieve material GHG emissions reductions. In so doing, the
nation will send a powerful message to the rest of the world,
which in turn may lead to further emissions reductions globally. Moreover, it will eliminate the inefficiencies and conflicts
that cause state energy policies to race to the middle in climate
policy. Consequently, a unified federal energy policy will give
the United States, and the world, a chance to weaken the blow
of catastrophic climate change.

future. For a number of reasons, such a dramatic decrease will
not become a reality unless the United States significantly abates
its GHG emissions. As yet, the federal government has not taken
serious steps to address the climate problem; indeed, it has made
little effort to reduce GHG emissions from energy.
Domestic energy is dominated by state energy policies.
Some of these states policies have measures to reduce GHG
emissions, primarily in the form of RPSs. There is an extensive
body of legal literature that attempts to answer whether RPSs represent a race to the top in either environmental or climate policy.
Existing race-to analyses are incomplete, however, because they
only address RPSs, which focus on in-state energy generation
and neglect production and exportation. Leakage and seepage of
emissions assures that GHG emission cannot be reduced through
RPSs alone. A comprehensive analysis of state energy policies
must therefore also account for the extraction and production of
energy resources in order to fully account for GHG emissions.
This Article instead approaches the race-to analysis from
a different perspective.
It focuses entirely on
net GHG emissions.
Decreased emissions
indicate a race to the top
while increased emissions indicate a race to
the bottom. Additionally,
the Article examines the
results from a national
perspective. Finally, the
Article accounts for both
generation and production, and thus incorporates emissions from
both leakage and seepage. From this different
perspective, the Article
concludes that the inherent conflict between and within state energy policies will lead to
emissions that increase or stagnate; state energy policies therefore represent, at best, a race to the middle in climate policy.
Accordingly, the United States should adopt a unified federal
energy policy that limits GHG emissions from domestic energy
generation and production through a national RPS and RPL.
By addressing generation and production, the United States can
meaningfully reduce GHG emissions. In the process, the nation
will provide both leadership and an emissions-reduction method
to the rest of the world that hopefully will result in reduced
global GHG emissions. Most importantly, it will give humanity a legitimate opportunity to avoid the worst consequences of
climate change.

“The United States must
implement a unified federal
energy policy that both
promotes the domestic
utilization of renewable energy
and restricts the domestic
extraction and production
of fossil fuels.”

CONCLUSION
Climate change presents an immense and nearly unimaginable threat to American society. In this century, the effects of
climate change will grow more pronounced and dire. While it
is likely too late to prevent all of the negative consequences of
global warming, the world may still have a chance to avoid catastrophic climate change. In order to avert the worst consequences,
global GHG emissions must dramatically decrease in the near
Winter 2015
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